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Abstract
This policy paper recommends that Lebanon should join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI). The EITI can benefit Lebanon by providing transparency in Lebanon’s industrial sector, which 
serves the public interest. It further could improve Lebanon’s economy and accountability by empowering 
communities and forming a relationship between government and civil society. The EITI also can help in 
building a trustworthy reputation for Lebanon, making Lebanon an appealing environment for investors. 
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ملخ�ص
اإذ   (EITI) اال�ستخراجية  ال�سفافية يف جمال ال�سناعات  مبادرة  اإىل  لبنان  بان�سمام جمهورية  الورقة  تو�سي هذه 
ت�سهم  العامة. كما  امل�سلحة  ال�سناعي مما يخدم  القطاع  ال�سفافية يف  االأخرية من حيث  لبنان من هذه  ي�ستفيد 
مبادرة ال�سفافية يف جمال ال�سناعات اال�ستخراجية (EITI) يف حت�سني االقت�ساد اللبناين وامل�ساءلة من خالل متكني 
املجتمعات وبناء عالقة بني الدولة واملجتمع املدين. كما ت�سهم مبادرة ال�سفافية يف جمال ال�سناعات اال�ستخراجية 
(EITI) يف بناء �سمعة موثوق بها للبنان مما يجعل منه بيئة جاذبة للم�ستثمرين.
الكلمات املفتاحية: مبادرة ال�سفافية يف جمال ال�سناعات اال�ستخراجية، لبنان، النفط والغاز، ال�سفافية، القانون، 
الف�ساد، االن�سمام واالمتثال، القانون العريف، �سركات النفط الوطنية، �سركات النفط الدولية، مبادئ التعادل
OPEN ACCESS
https://doi.org/10.29117/irl.2019.0010
© 2018 Al Kubaisi, Al Maraghi, Al Naimi, Al Bashir, Al Subaey, licensee QU Press. This is an open access article distributed 
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution license CC BY 4.0, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Cite this article as: Al Kubaisi S., Al Maraghi M., Al Naimi No., Al Naimi Na., Al Bashir R. & Al Subaey S., “Accession 
of Lebanon to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): Lessons Learned, Analysis, and Legal Aspects 
of Accession”, International Review of Law, TradeLab Special Issue, 2018
66
Background
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) sets a global standard for the promotion of open and 
accountable management of natural resources. Following recent discoveries of gas in Lebanon, there has been 
a growing interest in ensuring that more transparency and good governance are employed in the management 
of Lebanon’s energy reserves and in the legal aspects of its investment regime.
The interest of the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA), in particular, in the EITI, stems from the EITI’s 
key role as a leader in the fight against corruption, the promotion of transparency and good governance in the 
conduct of business in general, and the conduct of energy business in particular. In addition, LTA’s new strategy 
focuses among other things on its advocacy role concerning governance issues generally. 
Executive Summary
Lebanon’s petroleum exploration started in the 1930’s. Between 1947 and 1967, seven wells were drilled. The 
Lebanese Petroleum Company drilled the first well in 1953. Geologists were looking for methane and heavy 
hydrocarbons, but not oil, because oil explorations were expensive. Explorations came to a halt due to the 
ongoing civil war in Lebanon. However, in the 1990’s explorations began again in an offshore area. By 2013 the 
area had been marked and calculated. But no new gas wells had been drilled. Although Lebanon made it to a 
pre-qualification round for offshore licensing in 2013 and forty-six companies were successful, the completion 
of this licensing is pending due to lack of governmental approvals. 
These efforts in petroleum explorations happened while Lebanon was facing many conflicts. The first conflict 
in Lebanon took place in 1922, between sectarian groups. It led the Europeans to seize control of the country. 
In 1926 France succeeded to control parts of Lebanon, and the first Lebanese constitution was promulgated. In 
1940, during World War II, Britain sent troops to Lebanon to face the Germans, ultimately leading to Lebanon’s 
struggle for independence in 1941. After independence, the Palestine-Israel conflict arose in 1948; this conflict 
caused issues for Lebanon since it had accepted Palestinian refugees, causing a real sectarian conflict. These 
conflicts eventually resulted in a civil war in 1958. 
Sectarian-based conflict has impacted efforts in petroleum development. Lebanon is torn between tribes, 
religious groups, and political parties. This conflict has contributed to creating the conditions for patronage 
and corruption. There are three main types of corruption in Lebanon: political corruption, bureaucratic 
corruption, and grand corruption. Corruption has influenced the governmental system as well, leaving the oil 
industry with no proper management. 
Statistics and rankings of corruption rates establish that Lebanon lacks transparency; that is why this paper 
recommends Lebanon to join the EITI. The EITI can benefit Lebanon by providing transparency in Lebanon’s 
industrial sector, which will serve the public interest. It further could improve Lebanon’s economy and 
accountability by empowering communities and forming a relationship between government and civil society. 
The EITI also helps in building a trustworthy reputation for Lebanon, making Lebanon an appealing environment 
for investors.
1. What is the EITI?
The EITI sets a global standard for transparency in extractive industry payments and receipts. It promotes 
an open and accountable management of extractive resources. Providing transparency to the system is 
done with the goal of strengthening governments and industrial companies. Additionally, EITI aims to 
inform public debate and promote understanding among civil society by requiring implementing countries 
to form a Multi Stakeholder Group (MSG). Such groups consist of representatives from the government, 
oil companies, and civil society. 
Companies that operate in an EITI member country are required to publish what they pay to governments, 
and governments are required to publish what they receive from companies. The companies are obligated 
67
to disclose information along the entire extractive industry value chain, from the point of extraction, to 
how the revenue makes its way to the government, to how the revenue benefits the public. A state that is 
a party to the EITI is also obligated to submit reports annually, showing its progress and implementation 
of EITI regulations. 
1.1. History of the EITI
The idea of the EITI was first raised in 2002, when Tony Blair, former UK Prime Minister, outlined the idea 
in a speech delivered at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, September 2002. 
In June 2003, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) held a conference in London that 
included representatives from civil society, government, and companies. A statement of principles to 
increase transparency in the extractive sector resulted: the 12 EITI principles. Following this meeting, 
a few countries began to explore how these principles apply and later on signed to the EITI. 
The second meeting of the EITI-implementing countries took place in London in March 2005; in that 
meeting, it became increasingly clear that the EITI was not evolving. However, in 2009 the EITI board 
issued new versions of the EITI rules, in hopes of making the EITI meaningful. These rules replaced the 
EITI validation guide and included six “policy notes” that provided further clarification. These notes 
became requirements and were addressed as steps that implementing countries had to follow. In the 
2011 edition of the EITI rules, those requirements were more clearly articulated, and a number of 
new requirements were added, to ensure EITI quality. As a result, there were 21 requirements that 
implementing countries must follow and are, with the agreement of the stakeholder groups, encouraged 
to go beyond. 
Afterwards, the EITI began charting the next steps for transparency; the results of their strategies in 
resolving the issues were launched in Sydney in May of 2013. Goals included making EITI reports more 
understandable, making EITI reports more relevant in each country, requiring better and more accurate 
disclosure, recognizing countries that go beyond the minimum, and making a clearer set of rules.
Ultimately, a new set of requirements was introduced to the public in a conference in Peru in 2016. 
This latest revision is the EITI standard.1
1.2. Policy of transparency
The reason EITI requires transparency is that the EITI believes that a country’s natural resources, such 
as oil, gas, metals, and minerals, belong to its citizens. The way those natural resources are extracted 
plays a significant role in economic growth and social development. Poor natural resource governance 
typically leads to corruption and conflicts.
Lack of transparency creates a perfect environment for companies to engage in corrupt deals, leading 
to conflict with concerned citizens about where the money goes. More openness and public awareness 
of how wealth from a country’s extractive sector is used and managed is necessary to ensure that 
natural resources benefit all.
1.3. Legal status of the EITI
The EITI sets an international standard for transparency in extractive industry payments and receipts. 
In countries participating in the EITI, companies are required to publish what they pay to governments, 
and governments are required to publish what they receive from companies. When a state joins the 
EITI, its compliance is completely voluntary rather than mandatory. The organization operates on a 
“purely voluntary approach”, where governments are “encouraged” but not “required” to comply with 
the principles of transparency. 
Having said that, simply because the EITI has no legal enforcement does not mean it is useless or that 
it lacks effectiveness. The idea EITI promotes is stronger than to let its voluntary nature deprive it of 
1 History of the EITI: How It All Started, Where We Went, and Where We are Now, EITI, https://eiti.org/history (last visited 30 
November 2016).
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its effectiveness. It instantly shields a country that has joined with a strong statement that implies 
willingness to enter into clean, open, and free of corruption contracts. The countries gain increased 
prestige and recognition, which will encourage other countries and investors to do business with them. 
The voluntary nature of the EITI is not considered a weakness. Many regulations are purely voluntary 
and have other consequences, mainly political and reputational, that make their existence matter. 
Another reason for its significance is the possibility of an emerging customary law of transparency.
1.3.1. Political and reputational consequences
An example of the practical use of voluntary regulation is International Law itself. It includes hundreds 
of treaties that allow a state to sign of its own free will and have no legal consequences if the state 
decides to simply withdraw. 
Having said that, like the EITI, a treaty has other consequences, both political and reputational. 
For example, if a state signs and ratifies the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which mainly 
prevents using nuclear weapons, and that state party later decides to withdraw from the treaty, it 
has the right to leave of its own free will and no legal consequences will be applied. But it cannot 
be said that there will be no consequences to this action: even if there will be no legal ones, there 
will definitely be political ones. What kind of message will the country send to the world? Why did it 
withdraw? What does it have to hide? Withdrawal sends an implicit message that something doubtful 
is going on, that the state party possesses nuclear weaponry even if it does not. Its unjustified move 
will put the state in a questionable position vis-a-vis other states and will hurt its reputation. It 
will definitely raise a red flag about the withdrawn state. But if the party remains a member state 
to the treaty it will have a strong position that the country is a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS). 
Its membership shows confidence and stability, avoiding the harmful consequences of withdrawal. 
The situation is exactly the same when talking about the political role the EITI plays for states. As 
with the NPT, the EITI is purely voluntary and has no legal enforcement. Using the same hypothetical 
situation shows the other similarities between the situations. If a state joins the EITI, which requires 
implementing its standard of transparency, and later, the state decides to withdraw, no legal 
consequences will apply. But political ones definitely will. Similar questions as with the NPT will rise 
if the state decides to withdraw. Why did the country withdraw? Why was it unable to comply with 
the transparency standards? What is there to hide? Withdrawal will raise concerns that corruption 
is practiced within the state, concerns which will hurt the state’s business reputation and classify 
it as unreliable among other states. Withdrawal sends an implicit message that something shady is 
going on and puts the state in a weak position. 
In contrast, if the party remains a member in the EITI, it will be in a strong position. Its membership 
makes a strong statement about the country’s confidence and transparency in doing business, which 
will increase its chances of dealing with other states. It is a signal to investors and financial institutions 
that there will be increased transparency, accountability, and governance.
If the EITI has that powerful impact on a country’s business reputation, joining the EITI is the strongest 
solution for a country like Lebanon that lacks credibility and experience in the oil and gas business. 
Joining EITI is the first step to a strong and stable reputation that will lead the country to attract 
new deals and businesses from other investing countries.
Having said that, the EITI is not exclusive to poor or weak countries that do not know how to manage 
their resources. The EITI sets a global standard to promote transparent and accountable management 
of natural resources. Countries with rich natural resources will benefit as much as poorer ones by 
adding transparency: for any country, it increases trust between the country and its investors and 
between the country and its citizens. More openness and public information about how wealth from 
a country’s extractive sector is used and managed is necessary to ensure that natural resources 
benefit all. It seeks to strengthen government and company systems, inform public debate and 
promote understanding. A company’s belief that it is required to comply with certain rules, such as 
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the EITI transparency standards, to avoid being expelled and to prevent exposure to political and 
reputational risks, is a force by itself. 
To support the points above, this paper will provide practical evidence of the EITI’s effectiveness 
through information found in the EITI progress report of 2016. The graph below shows the compliance 
of countries despite the voluntary nature of EITI, which is an indicator of its effectiveness:2




1.3.2. The possibility of an emerging customary law of transparency




General principles of law.
The emergence of a customary law depends on two elements: an objective element, that is, evidence 
of general practice, and a subjective element, that is, acceptance of the practice as law. The practice 
must be accompanied by the belief that this practice is required by law and is binding. Both the 
objective and the subjective elements are needed to establish a new rule of international custom.
In the case of the EITI, the general practice is the implementation of the transparency standard that 
requires the disclosure of contracts and information. The acceptance of the practice as law applies 
to the countries that comply with the practice in the belief that it is binding.
Therefore, if the transparency standard continues and proves to be a fundamental standard applied 
in doing business, and countries continue to apply it, practice and time will establish the belief in 
it as an obligation required by law. It may then emerge to become a customary law. So Lebanon 
joining the EITI is not only immediately beneficial but also allows the country to make a long-term 
contribution to the emergence of customary international law.
1.4. Process for applying to the EITI
EITI is a global organization that promotes transparent management of natural resources such as oil 
and gas. Its standards apply from the moment of extracting the natural resource, to the process of 
maintaining the revenue through the government, all the way to the benefits of the state and public. 
1.4.1. Steps to join the EITI
There are several steps to follow in the application for membership of EITI.
First step: A state must show some government commitments, which are mentioned in provision 
1.1 of the EITI Requirements: The state must make an unequivocal public statement that shows its 
intention to implement the EITI, and the statement must be issued through the head of state or 
government or by a person who is properly assigned as a government representative. Further, the 
state must appoint a senior person to implement the EITI. 
Second step: The state must take steps to engage the companies, in accordance with provision 1.2 
of the requirements.
Third step: The state must engage civil society in the process of implementing the EITI and ensure that 
there are no obstacles that will negatively affect its participation, in accordance with provision 1.3. 
Fourth step: The state must establish a multi-stakeholder group, in accordance with provision 1.4. 
Fifth step: Under provision 1.5, the state must issue a work plan through the multi-stakeholder group 
that consists of costs and measurable actions that meet the report deadlines issued by the EITI.4
Those five steps must be considered prior to filling the application form. If the requirements are 
fulfilled, then the state might become a candidate and start working on the first report in making 
some issues transparent. This report may be regarding the laws, fiscal regimes, and contracts that 
the country has signed, as well as the income to the government.5
3 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 24 October 1945, http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute.
4 Guide to implementing the EITI Standard: Requirement 1, Governance and oversight of the EITI process, EITI, https://eiti.org/
guide#sign-up-and-governance (last visited 2 January 2018).
5 See EI Academy (Extractive Industries Academy), What is EITI? And why you want it, YouTube (28 April 2015), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=Fy1x03cEjB4 (one of a series of videos in a digital library that explains extractive industries issues and technology 
in brief).
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2. NOCs and IOCs in Lebanon
For international oil companies (IOCs) or national oil companies (NOCs) to function in Lebanon, they have to 
have the rights to explore, produce, and develop oil through a contract called the Exploration and Production 
Agreement (EPA). The EPA is a contract between the state and the NOC or IOC. Companies that sign the 
EPA are required to comply with all of the requirements of the Offshore Petroleum Resources Law (OPR).6
Energy-producing countries generally have an NOC that partners with an IOC to explore, produce, and 
market the oil or gas. It is important to note that Lebanon does not have an NOC. Examples of competent 
NOCs, such as Saudi Aramco and Qatar Petroleum, are found in neighboring countries. Most oil companies 
in Lebanon are internationally-based companies operating in Lebanon. 
The East Mediterranean basin is a well-known area that has 1.7 billion barrels of undiscovered oil, and 
122 trillion cubic feet.7 Despite the great reserves hidden in Lebanese waters, Lebanon is not yet an oil-
producing country. All the oil consumed in Lebanon in 2008 was imported.8 As of 2012, the leading Lebanese 
importers and distributors of petroleum products are MEDCO, Total, and HYPCO.9 Lebanon used to be a 
refinery center for crude oil but both Lebanese oil refineries, Zahrani and Tripoli, had to be closed down 
due to damage and general instability caused by the civil war.10
2.1. Regulatory bodies for oil and gas in Lebanon
Petroleum activities in Lebanon are regulated and managed by the following regulatory bodies:
Council of Ministers: This is responsible for setting the state’s general petroleum policy and managing 
petroleum resources in the country.
The Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW): This is responsible for ensuring a good implementation 
of the petroleum policy and related laws and for monitoring and supervising petroleum activities. It 
signs contracts with IOCs and takes necessary measures to protect water, health, property, and the 
environment from pollution.
The Lebanese Petroleum Administration (LPA): This is an autonomous public entity created in 2012, 
under the OPR Law, to regulate, manage and monitor all petroleum activities. However, some of its 
financial and administrative decisions are subject to the approval of the MEW. 
2.2. Laws regulating oil and gas in Lebanon 
As onshore regulations are yet to be enacted, one main law regulates petroleum activities within 
Lebanon’s territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone. 
Offshore Petroleum Resources Law No. 132/2010 (OPR Law): The OPR Law, previously mentioned, is 
the most important law in regulating the oil and gas industry in Lebanon. It includes 10 chapters that 
consist of 77 articles that cover the processes of licensing and exploration. The OPR Law is supplemented 
by the previously-mentioned Petroleum Activities Regulations (Decree No. 10289, dated 30 April 2013) 
(PA Regs). These cover the legal representation of the rights of interest holders, as well as exploration, 
production, and transportation rights. 
6 Lebanese Petroleum Administration, The Exploration and Production Agreement, http://www.lpa.gov.lb/epa.php (last visited 3 
January 2018). This page provides a link to a blank EPA contract form, which can also be found at: http://www.lpa.gov.lb/pdf/
Decree%20%2043%20-%20EPA%20-%20Rev%206%20-%2029-09-2015.pdf.
7 see BankMed Mkt. & Res. Div., Oil and Gas in Lebanon (2014), https://www.bankmed.com.lb/BOMedia/subservices/categories/
News/20150515170326030.pdf. 
8 See Central Administration for Statistics, Lebanon in Figures 8, 11 (2008), http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/PDFs/Lebanon-
Figures-2008. pdf.
9 Oil Companies in Lebanon | List of Largest Oil Companies in Lebanon, Marcopolis, (16 August 2012), http://www.marcopolis.
net/top-oil-and-gas-companies-in-lebanon.htm.
10 Bernadette Michalski, The Mineral Industry of Lebanon, in U.S.G.S. Minerals Yearbook (1997), https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/
pubs/country/1997/9221097.pdf.
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Delineation and Declaration of the Maritime Regions of the Lebanese Republic Law No. 163/2011: 
This law consists of 18 articles that determine Lebanon’s internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous 
zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf. It is consistent with the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.11
3. Lebanon political history and sectarianism
Lebanon is considered a parliamentary democratic country;12 in a way, this structure affects political 
interests. Political interests can be achieved through the formation of groups and associations. Therefore, 
the way that people organize themselves in social groups, or collectives, contributes significantly in 
determining the political system in the country.13 In Lebanon, there are a number of religious sects and 
groups with competing interests, which has periodically resulted in conflicts. 
In 1922, the first conflict took place in Lebanon between the Druze and Maronite sects, which led Europeans 
to seize control of the country.14 In 1926 France succeeded in controlling parts of Lebanon, and the 
first Lebanese constitution was promulgated. The constitution recognized the role of eighteen official 
religious sects and recognized all citizens as equals.15 In 1941, during World War II, Lebanon struggled 
for independence.16 In 1943, the national pact republic was established, which recognized sectarianism 
in Lebanon and set a foundation for a “sectarian power-sharing system” as a base for the Lebanese 
governmental system,17 and Lebanon achieved independence.
Conflicts continued in the following years. Israeli conflicts with Palestine arose in 1948. This conflict 
caused issues to Lebanon since it had accepted Palestinian refugees, causing a major sectarian conflict.18 
That situation led Christians to call for power distribution and called for declaring Lebanon as a sectarian 
republic. However, these calls failed and crisis arose, leading to a civil war that lasted from 1975 until 
1990.19 The 1989 Taef Agreement, Document of National Accord,20 sought to balance the diversity in the 
political system to terminate the civil war. The Taef Agreement redistributed powers evenly between 
Muslims and Christians in Lebanon. 
Unfortunately, the Taef Agreement failed to resolve various issues. Political issues between Sunni and 
Shi’a left no choice but to sign another agreement, titled the Doha Agreement, in 2008. It was a trade-off 
between the rights of maintaining weapons for Shi’a and pursuing special relations with Iran, with the 
Sunni maintaining the power of the Prime Minister in running economic and internal-domestic affairs.21 
The Doha Agreement, as with others, did not resolve the endless sectarian conflict in Lebanon.
Once a system is built based on the diversity of public will, then the interest of diverse groups is going to 
evolve into new conflicts.22 Further, it is predictable for the Lebanese political future that the struggle of 
maintaining powers among the sectarian groups is going to be a continuous conflict. Recently, this struggle 
has been shown in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in 2005. “This is reflective of the sharp divisions along 
11 Lebanon’s Promised Oil Wealth, The Monthly, December 2013, at 4, 6, http://monthlymagazine.com/cms/upload/magazine/137-
en.pdf. 
12 Imad Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon 83 (2014).
13 Id. at 84.
14 Id. at 25.
15 Id. at 27.
16 Id. at 29.
17 Id. at 30.
18 Id. at 32.
19 Id. at 34.
20 Id. at 54, 56.
21 Id. at 86.
22 Id. at 85.
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increasingly sectarian lines and incompatible visions of Lebanon’s past, present, and future.”23 Due to the 
history of sectarianism and other political and social challenges, it is in the best interest of the Lebanese 
people to have access to information regarding an important sector as energy, which EITI provides. 
3.1. Separation of powers
An overview of the governmental system in Lebanon will help explain how it will govern new projects, 
such as the production of oil and gas in Lebanon.
The principle of “separation of powers” has been adopted in the Lebanese constitution.24 The powers 
are divided into three branches of government: the legislative branch, which makes the law; the 
executive branch, which enforces the law; and the judicial branch, which arbitrates and monitors the 
application of the law and its enforcement. This principle should make the government work properly, 
in a way that prevents bad governance of new projects and battles corruption.
The legislative branch
The Lebanese constitution declares Lebanon to be a parliamentary republic. The legislative branch is 
called the National Assembly of Representatives or the Chamber of Deputies, but it is generally called 
the Parliament. Parliament is the only governmental entity that is elected directly by the public; 
consequently, it is considered the most powerful and has significant powers relative to other branches 
of the government.25 Since Taef Agreement in 1992, its members have been composed evenly of Muslims 
and Christians. Although the parliament has the competence to exercise several roles, such as introducing 
proposed laws to the Chamber, the Council of Ministers tends to exercise control over this particular 
role.26 The Council of Ministers’ interference extends to the approval of the proposed legislation, even 
though it must be sent on to other governmental leaders before achieving final approval.27
The executive branch 
The executive branch is divided between the President and the Prime Minister.28 Both have the obligation 
to report to the parliament seeking the approval on most critical issues, such as the formation of 
government. The Lebanese governmental system thus, fuses the legislative and executive branches 
together, and there is no strict separation of powers. It means that there may be limited control of 
executive actions by the elected representatives of people.29
The judicial branch
The Lebanese judicial branch is horizontally divided into three main court systems; each has a hierarchical 
structure.30 In addition, general prosecutors are considered a judicial party in Al-Niyaba Al-Ammah. The 
process runs under the Ministry of Justice; so that the judicial system is dominated by both judicial and 
executive branches.31 Despite the fact that the constitution addresses the judicial branch in a way that 
makes it independent, in reality it did not reach the independence goal, since the executive branch 
interferes through the Ministry of Justice in the process of appointment of the judges, transferring 
judges based on sectarianism, and some other roles.
All in all, even though Lebanon is a parliamentary republic and adopts the principle of separation of 
powers, it is not reaching the aim of this principle. Unfortunately, those principles are affected by other 
political factors, such as sectarianism. Thus, the whole system is directly influenced by sectarianism, 
since the separation cannot be accomplished because of the various interests. Therefore, “sectarian 
23 Salamey, supra note 12, at 88.
24 Mona Alami, Article, Lebanon must uphold democratic principles, June 2013.
25 Salamey, supra note 12, at 140.
26 Id. at 147-51 (concerning the Council of Ministers).
27 Id. at 129-30.
28 Id. at 141-51.
29 Id. at 154-55.
30 Id. at 154.
31 Id. 
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confessionalism has delegated explicit and implicitly powers to each institution.”32 The lack of strict 
separation of powers, sectarian-based appointment, and the lack of independence for the judiciary, 
coupled with an ineffective prosecutorial system; creates conditions for patronage and corruption. The 
Lebanese governmental system thus, fuses the legislative, executive and judicial branches together, 
and there is no strict separation of powers. This is an avenue for corruption and bad governance. 
For the purposes of the nascent energy industry, therefore, resorting to external transparency bodies 
such as EITI can help ameliorate the apparent absence of effective check and balances in governmental 
systems.
3.2. Corruption in Lebanon
Due to the inefficient governmental system, as previously discussed, the corruption rate in Lebanon 
is growing.
There are three main types of corruption:
3.2.1. Political corruption
According to Transparency International, citizens of Lebanon ranked their political parties and 
Parliament amongst the top three most corrupt institutions of the country in 2011.33 Therefore, 
political corruption is considered a dominant problem in Lebanon. Another report by Freedom House 
stated that “Lebanon is not an electoral democracy” because of issues of vote-buying that Lebanese 
political life suffers from.34 Lebanon lacks regulations for political party financing, providing a space 
for political corruption to take place. It also lacks proper legislative accountability, which should 
be strengthened to prevent such corruption. Global Integrity categorized these two areas as “very 
weak” in 2009.35 
The following figure by World Justice Project36 supports the conclusion that corruption is likely to 
occur in the oil and gas industry:
32 Salamey, supra note 12, at 154.
33 Global Corruption Barometer, Transparency International (2010/11), http://www.transparency.org/gcb201011.
34 Freedom in the World: Lebanon, Freedom House (2012), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/lebanon.
35 Global Integrity Report 2009: Lebanon, Global Integrity (2009), https://www.globalintegrity.org/research/reports/global-integrity-
report/global-integrity-report-2009/gir-scorecard-2009-lebanon/.
36 Rule of Law Index 2016: Lebanon, World Justice Project (2016), http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#/groups/LBN.
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3.2.2. Bureaucratic corruption 
“Inefficient government bureaucracy is the second most important obstacle for doing business in the 
country, which encourages the use of bribery to speed up or ‘grease’ processes.”37
Bribery is a main concern in Lebanon and has been proven to take place mostly in governmental 
sectors. A survey conducted by the Lebanese Transparency Association found that bribery is commonly 
needed to do business in Lebanon: 65% of the companies surveyed faced situations where they had to 
pay bribes. Also, 47.8% of the same companies had to pay between 1 to 5% of their annual revenues 
as unofficial payments to public officials.38 
Bribery does not just take place in governmental circles. It also takes place among citizens of Lebanon 
themselves. Another survey has found that more than one-third of the citizens surveyed admitting 
to having paid a bribe. Mostly with customs, the registry, and permit services. The police and the 
judiciary were found to be the most frequent bribe takers.39 As a result, companies who have done 
business in Lebanon have identified corruption as one of the main obstacles for doing business in 
Lebanon.40 This implies Lebanon’s bad business reputation among companies, which could hinder 
Lebanon’s future with potential investors. 
Another survey conducted by the World Bank/IFC Enterprise, proves that Lebanon’s bad reputation 
goes beyond companies that have worked with Lebanon. It reaches potential companies who have 
not yet worked with Lebanon and who expect to have to offer gifts to civil servants in order to 
accomplish work.41
3.2.3. Grand corruption
A 2009 World Bank/IFC Enterprise survey indicated rampant bribery in the area of government 
contracts. Nearly all (97.7%) of the companies that participated in the survey had either paid bribes, 
or been expected to do so, to get such a contract.42 Procurement regulations are unsuitable and 
inconvenient, and the system is non-transparent. There are no rules against conflicts of interest for 
procurement officials, and no way to check their personal assets. The regulatory weaknesses and lacks, 
promote corruption and make any investigation of the basis for decisions a practical impossibility.43 
There are many sectors in which corruption can be found: political parties, public administration, 
the police, Parliament, and the judiciary. The examples in the following section highlight the sectors 
most affected by corruption.
3.2.4. Sectors most affected by corruption
Political parties
Lebanon’s safeguards are highly insufficient; they can assure neither the integrity of political party 
financing nor the financial support of candidates. According to Transparency International’s Global 
Corruption Barometer 2011, political parties are considered the most corrupt sector of society.44
Public administration
Lebanon’s public administration lacks suitable resources and efficient safeguards against political 
37 Sofia Wickberg, Transparency International, U4 Expert Answer: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Lebanon, U4 Anti-
Corruption Resource Centre 3 (15 October 2012). 
38 Id. (citing a 2010 survey by the Lebanese Transparency Association no longer generally available online).
39 Id. (citing Global Corruption Barometer, supra note 33).
40 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 at 228, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_
GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf [hereinafter, Global Competitiveness Report]. 
41 http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploreeconomies/2013/lebanon#corruption, World Bank/IFC. 2013.
42 Wickberg, supra note 37, at 3 (citing a World Bank/IFC Enterprise Survey no longer generally available online).
43 Id. 
44 Global Corruption Barometer, supra note 33.
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interference. It provides inequality in regard to access to basic public services. Its inefficiency can 
be linked to its unqualified staff and its misuse of available resources. This led the citizens to rank 
the public administration as the second most corrupt sector in Lebanon.45 Surveyed citizens ranked 
the Customs Authority as the institution requesting the most bribes.46
The WEF Global Competitiveness Report has listed inefficient government bureaucracy as the second 
main obstacle to doing business in Lebanon.47 The first obstacle to doing business in Lebanon, as 
previously mentioned, is bribery. The Lebanese Transparency Association also confirmed the bribery 
issue by stating that “Bribery is rife within the public administration and is considered a basic norm 
in the domestic political life.”48 
Overall, Lebanon is currently threatened by both political instability due to sectarianism and an 
inefficient governmental system that helps promote corruption. It is therefore recommended, for 
the purpose of the energy industry, that Lebanon takes the necessary measures to try to lower 
the possibility of corruption, given that the energy industry business plays a significant role in the 
economic growth and social development of a country. It is strongly suggested that Lebanon joins a 
transparency body such as the EITI that requires implementing transparency throughout the process 
of extracting natural recourses. 
4. Assessment of Middle-Eastern EITI experiences
The EITI’s presence in the Middle East region was first marked with Yemen’s implementation of the EITI 
in September 2007. Soon after, in 2009, Iraq followed suit. Falling within the same geopolitical scope, 
Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq are all areas of conflict. So that Lebanon may benefit from the lessons learned. 
This is a brief overview of the experience of Middle Eastern states that have adopted the EITI. 
4.1. EITI in Yemen
Yemen is a small oil producer. Unlike many regional oil producers, Yemen relies heavily on foreign oil 
companies that have production-sharing agreements with the government. Although it is an oil-producing 
state, Yemen is one of the poorest countries, where 45% of the population lives in poverty.49 The reliance 
on oil in generating revenues for the country shows why EITI is of great significance to Yemen. Adopting 
high transparency standards in the sector would reduce or hamper chances of embezzlements.
In 2007 Yemen expressed its intent to adopt the EITI.50 The government then started taking the suitable 
measures to achieve EITI candidacy by forming a Multi-Stakeholder Group, “YEITI”, comprised of 
government representatives, civil-society groups, and representatives of oil companies. Later on the 
same year, Yemen was announced as a candidate.51 YEITI published reports from 2005-2007. After the 
reports were validated, Yemen was announced compliant with the EITI in 2011. Immediately after its 
validation, however, the state was suspended due to its political instability: the people of Yemen were 
calling for the resignation of the then Yemeni president Ali Saleh in what was later called the Arab 
Spring. The suspension was lifted in June 2012 based on the application made by the Government of 
Yemen, represented by the Minister of Oil and Minerals.52
45 Global Corruption Barometer, supra note 33.
46 Id.
47 Global Competitiveness Report, supra note 40. 
48 Wickberg, supra note 37, at 4 (citing a 2011 National Integrity System Study by the Lebanese Transparency Association no longer 
generally available online).
49 Shiyuan Chen & Mark Schreiner, A Simple Poverty Scorecard for Yemen (22 May 2009), http://www.simplepovertyscorecard.com/
YEM_2005_ENG.pdf. 
50 Yemen, EITI, https://eiti.org/yemen (last visited 3 January 2018) [hereinafter Yemen].
51 Id.
52 Yemen EIT National Secretariat, The Annual Report, Yemen Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (26 June 2014), https://
eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/2013_yemen-annual_activity_report.pdf [hereinafter Yemen Annual Report].
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After the suspension was lifted, Yemen EITI was not in a position to meet the EITI requirements as a 
compliant country during 2012 – mainly the production of the YEITI Second Report – due to various 
reasons emanating from the crisis in Yemen. The crisis had negative impacts on many projects all over 
the country, in general, and on Yemen EITI, in particular. Yemen continued to struggle with negative 
consequences of the political and security crisis that caused further delay in the production the 
YEITI Second Report 53 and caused another suspension to be placed by the EITI International Board on 
February 2013. The publication of the Second Report in June 2013 caused the suspension of Yemen’s 
EITI membership to be lifted in July 2013. But Yemen was suspended yet again in March 2015 (and still 
is) because of its unstable and insecure situation. 
Effectiveness
In measuring the effectiveness of the implementation of the EITI in Yemen, light must be shed on the 
participation of civil society as a stakeholder. In the 2011 validation report54 issued by Coffey International 
Development,55 the validator noted that although government and civil society stakeholders tend to 
believe that everyone in the Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) has sufficient capacity, civil society members 
in the MSG are required to increase their understanding of the basics of oil and gas industry exploration 
and products, as well as major oil and gas revenue streams, for better performance. Therefore, it is 
important to emphasize that the civil society representatives in Lebanon should have a good grasp of 
sophisticated and technical concepts in the oil industry.
One of EITI’s primary goals is to publicize detailed information on revenues and allocation of costs 
so the public can engage in debate and dialogue. There was no evidence of community engagement 
in Yemen, which means that more comprehensive studies must be made to evaluate and assess the 
emergence of the Yemen EITI. Therefore, if Lebanon joins the EITI, such studies should be conducted.
4.2. EITI in Iraq 
Iraq is a major oil exporting state and is a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Iraq has implemented the EITI since 2010 and was declared an EITI compliant country 
following a successful validation in 2012 by Adam Smith International.56 Iraq has submitted five reports 
covering the period 2007-2014, the latest of which was submitted in March 2016. A new validation 
and assessment by the EITI under the more comprehensive EITI Standard was scheduled for 2016. 
Iraq’s reports saw progress year after year. The country sometimes went beyond the requirements and 
provided data on revenue income by company in a disaggregated manner;57 other countries followed its 
example. A sign of the Iraq EITI (IEITI) successful implementation was its expansion in 2013 to include 
reports on the mining sector.58 However, in a report on reforms, the EITI recommended that NOCs 
reports must be audited in accordance with international accounting standards instead of the outdated 
accounting standards of Iraqi Board of Supreme Audit. This was to avoid creating “an understanding 
gap between national oil companies as compared with the industry practice.”59
53 Yemen, supra note 50.
54 Yemen Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Validation Report (January 2011), https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/
migrated_files/Yemen_Final_Validation_Report_EN.pdf.
55 Validation reports are reports issued by an independent validator and reviewed by the EITI board. They are intended to provide 
all stakeholders with an impartial assessment of whether EITI implementation in a country is in line with the provisions of the 
EITI Standard.
56 See Adam Smith International, Validation Report for IEITI: Final Report, https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/2012_
iraq_validation_report.pdf.
57 See EITI International Secretariat, The EITI, NOCs & The First Trade; The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as a Tool 
for Improving the Trading Climate with National Oil Companies (NOCs) (2015), https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/
EITI_Brief_NOC_FirstTrade_March2015.pdf.
58 Iraqi Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (IEITI), Oil Export, Local Consumption and Field Development: Report 2013 
(2015), https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/2013_iraq_eiti_report.pdf [hereinafter Iraqi Report].
59 See EITI Reports to Reform (February 2016), page 19, https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/from_reports_to_reforms.
pdf.
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Iraq has also been considering using the experience it gained through the current EITI process to launch 
a draft Iraq EITI Law inspired by the existing Petroleum Law.60 It is also important to note that the IEITI 
has been carrying out its work in the midst of sectarian conflicts. This situation suggests that a state 
can still abide by the EITI standards even in periods of instability. 
Lebanon should take the positive experience that the EITI had in Iraq, and should follow their lead in 
implementing the EITI.
Effectiveness
The IEITI multi-stakeholder council has been the primary leader of the progress being made despite 
political and security risks in Iraq. In a “historic”61 move in 2014, the civil society organized the first 
election of civil society representatives in the IEITI council as a part of a forum. The forum included 
between 500 and 600 participants from more than 380 civil society organizations, and the participants 
held constructive discussions. Considering the emergence of ISIS at that time, such a step was indeed 
historic. This demonstrates a good level of public awareness among Iraqi civil society. Such discussions 
can lead to the development of questions to pressure the government or companies and hold them 
accountable. 
Even though YEITI and IEITI do not seem ideal, their implementation has been a good start towards 
fighting what some would call the “resource curse.” Iraq, in particular, is an example that shows that 
when there is a political will, progress can be made. However, field studies should be conducted in 
implementing countries, closely measuring and evaluating the experience and its reflections. Future 
recommendations and reconciliations will be building blocks towards better transparency. 
The role of civil society and parliamentarians in acting upon published reports is of great importance.62 
The community should promote the EITI by holding discussions, forums, and debates to tackle issues 
and discrepancies in the reports in order for the community to benefit from their publication. The 
Lebanese Transparency Association, in particular, can play a vital role in promoting the EITI in Lebanon 
by educating the public. Parliamentarians, on the other hand, should enact legislation according to the 
needs addressed by the MSG. Overall, although it does not ensure absence of corruption, transparency 
will lead to better governance.
4.3. Grounds of suspension
A state can be suspended even after being a member of the EITI. However, while some countries are 
suspended, others are not, even though they might have similar circumstances.
4.3.1. Grounds of the suspension based on the comparison between Yemen and Iraq
The EITI Requirement number 8.6 states the grounds for suspension. Sections (a) and (b) of 8.6 
deal directly with the situation of Yemen and Iraq, where the provision states when suspension can 
happen. In summary, the sections state:
Breaches of the EITI principles and requirements: the EITI will delist or suspend a state if it breaches 
a significant principle or requirement. This includes cases where states do not comply with the 
requirement of timely EITI reporting.
Political instability or conflict: the EITI board may decide to suspend countries facing political instability 
or conflict that reflects badly on the state, in a way that prevents countries from complying with 
important EITI requirements.
60 Iraq - EITI Implementation Support Project (2016), Washington, DC: World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/449741473277389006/Iraq-EITI-Implementation-Support-Project. 
61 Pablo Valverde, Iraq civil society holds historic elections, EITI (15 December 2014), https://eiti.org/blog/iraq-civil-society-holds-
historic-elections.
62 See generally Building Civil Society Organizations (CSO) Capacity to Support the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) in Yemen, Knowledge Sharing for Results (20 July 2011), https://www.knowledgesharingfordev.org/story/building-civil-
society-organizations-cso-capacity-support-extractive-industries-transparency. 
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4.3.2. Comparison between Yemen and Iraq situations 
1. The first suspension for Yemen was on the grounds of the political instability; since then, it has 
been suspended due to the sharp political and security crisis. When the suspension was lifted, 
Yemen still showed that it is affected badly due to political crisis, and that effect was reflected 
on the implementation of the EITI. 
2. To ensure that Yemen had the chance to show more compliance, its suspension was lifted three times. 
Yemen still was not able to comply; it was continuously affected by the political circumstances, 
causing delays in submitting the reports and in meeting other requirements. 
3. Iraq might have similar circumstances, but it showed a significant commitment to the EITI 
requirements. Iraq did not show slowed progress, and it did not show any signs of bad reflections 
on its implementation of the EITI. Iraq has been declared compliant since 2012, and it has never 
been suspended for any reason until the present day. 
All in all, Iraq and Yemen might have had similar circumstances, but their responses towards those 
circumstances have been completely different. And that is what matters to the EITI. 
Lebanon can take advantage of previous experiences since both countries are Middle Eastern states, 
and they both offer lessons to consider. To avoid being suspended, Iraq showed noticeable progress in 
meeting the requirements despite the political conflict. Therefore, Lebanon must follow the guidelines 
that Iraq has been following and keep reporting effectively regardless of the political status. Lebanon 
can even establish relations with other international institutions, as a backup management resource 
to keep reporting effectively, even if Lebanon collapses politically.  
5. Benefits of the EITI
The EITI has several benefits that could improve state governance. Lebanon clearly needs this help because 
its government has changed a lot in the past years. In addition, a lot of cases have shown that Lebanon’s 
government has been unable to maintain transparency. The EITI should help the government maintain a 
steady flow of transparency, which will then build trust between government, companies, and citizens. 
Further, the EITI interacts with civil societies and empowers them to have more roles in maintaining 
transparency since the EITI requires establishing a Multi-Stakeholders Group that consists of members of 
the government, civil society, and companies. 
Additionally, the EITI can help to reduce the risks for the extractive industries companies by improving 
corporate risk management through showing what is being paid to the government and to the communities. 
This improves revenue collection and the management process, as well as providing a forum to discuss 
broader extractive industry governance issues such as physical and process audits, contracts transparency, 
and sub-national revenues. 
Further, the EITI builds trust and dialogue, demonstrates a national commitment to transparency, and 
promotes accountability, all of which improve business climate. Once it builds trust, Lebanon will become 
more appealing for investors because a trustworthy reputation for the country means big companies starting 
businesses in Lebanon. This will help Lebanon in attracting new businesses to the country because everything 
would be out in the open: it will show all the communities (governmental, society, and companies) where 
the money is coming from and where it is spent. 
To conclude, the EITI is about transparency and Lebanon struggles with corruption, leading scholars to 
recommend an instrument to reduce corruption: the EITI.63 64
63 Natural Resource Governance Institute, Publications, http://www.resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/extractive-
industries-transparency-initiative-eiti (last visited 3 January 2018). 
64 Megan Wynne, How EITI involvement can benefit Corporations, Global Policy (25 February 2016), http://www.globalpolicyjournal.
com/blog/25/02/2016/how-eiti-involvement-can-benefit-corporations.
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5.1. Disadvantages of the EITI 
1. Limited mandate (narrow view of transparency)
2. Voluntary rather than mandatory compliance 
3. Public and private sector resistance 
4. Dependence on strong civil society 
5. Green-washing (some groups have accused the EITI of enabling them to perpetuate green-washing)
6. Strategic manipulation.65 
5.2. An Alternative to EITI?
5.2.1. The Equator Principles66
The Equator Principles is a risk management framework adopted by financial institutions to determine, 
assess, and manage environmental and social risk projects. It is intended to provide a minimum 
standard for due diligence to support responsible risk decision-making. The Equator Principles was 
formally launched in Washington, DC on 4 June 2003, and it was based on an existing environmental 
and social policy framework established by the International Finance Corporation. Since then, the 
Equator Principles have been revised, and the framework was relaunched on 4 June 2013.
The Equator Principles apply globally to all industry sectors and provide four financial products:
1. Project finance advisory services 
2. Project finance 
3. Project-related corporate loans
4. Bridge loans
The Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs) commit to implementing the Equator Principles 
in their internal environmental and social policies.
These are the 10 principles:
1. Review and categorization
2. Environmental and social assessment 
3. Applicable environmental and social standards 
4. Environmental and social management system and equator principles action plan 
5. Stakeholder engagement 
6. Grievance mechanism 
7. Independent review
8. Covenants
9. Independent monitoring and reporting 
10. Reporting and transparency 
As of January 2016, 87 financial institutions in 36 countries have officially adopted the Equator 
Principles, which covers 70% of the international project finance debt in emerging markets.67 
65 See Benjamin K. Sovacool, Energy and Ethics: Justice and the Global Energy Challenge, 2013. 
66 See Francis N. Botchway, Natural Resources Investment and Africa’s Development, (ed. 2011). 
67 About the Equator Principles, Equator Principles: environmental and social risk management for projects, http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about. 
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5.2.2. The Equator Principles and Lebanon
There are 12 members of the Equator Principles association steering committee. One of them is 
Citigroup,68 which has a bank in Lebanon (Citibank). Another financial institution that applies the 
equator principles is The Arab African International Bank, which also has a bank in Lebanon.69
As of now, the Equator Principles apply principally to financial institutions and products. Indirectly, the 
framework can apply to the emerging energy industry in Lebanon through the financial involvement 
of Citigroup and other banks that may be involved in the industry in Lebanon. For the immediate 
purposes of the energy industry in Lebanon, though, the EITI is a better option and the realistic option. 
Conclusion
The EITI is a global standard to promote the open and accountable management of natural resources. 
Following recent discoveries of gas in Lebanon, there has been a growing interest to ensure that more 
transparency and good governance are employed in the management of Lebanon’s energy reserves and the 
legal aspects of its investment regime.
Transparency leads to better governance of natural resources. Therefore, this paper advises Lebanon to join 
the EITI, first, by explaining what the EITI is, its legal nature, and the mechanism of joining; and second, by 
providing reasons why it is necessary for Lebanon to join the EITI, namely corruption. It also illustrates the 
advantages of joining the EITI and how it will promote transparency. Further, the paper analyzes previous 
accessions of other regional countries to EITI, and shows key success factors for Lebanon.
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